Introducing the British politician, scholar, and geographer who is considered one of the pioneers of geopolitics and geostrategy. He is credited for bringing the concepts ‘heartland’ and ‘manpower’ into the English language. His name was Sir Halford John Mackinder.
According to reports, he served as the director of the London School of Economics from 1903 to 1908 and as the first principal of University Extension College, Reading (which later became the University of Reading) from 1892 to 1903. In 1903, Mackinder changed his stance from one of liberalism and free markets to one of conservatism and protectionism. He served as Glasgow Camlachie’s Conservative and Unionist Member of Parliament from 1910 until 1922, all the while pursuing his studies part-time. He began serving as the London School of Economics’ geography professor in 1923.
Discover a different side of Lord Curzon as well. Lord Curzon, a British statesman, Conservative politician, explorer, and author who held the positions of Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905 and Foreign Secretary from 1919 to 1924, is notorious for partitioning Bengal in 1905 with the intention of stifling the growing nationalist movement under the pretence of administrative efficiency and development in all of Bengal’s districts. Lord Curzon, who oversaw the division of Bengal in 1905, clashed with Lord Kitchener on matters of military structure. Later that year, he resigned and went back to England since he was unable to win the support of the London administration.
However, Lord Curzon is also recognized for his excellent qualities. He endeavoured to remedy the British mistreatment of Indians, restored the Taj Mahal, launched a British mission to Tibet to thwart Russian aspirations, and pursued a variety of administrative reforms. Halford J. Mackinder, an anti-Bolshevik, was nominated by Lord Curzon as the British High Commissioner in Southern Russia in late 1919.
In British public life throughout the 20th century, Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861–1947) was an uncommon polymath. He had a varied and amazing career. It may have represented the careers of five or more men, not just one. Higher education, public service, diplomacy, politics, and exploration were among the topics discussed. Mackinder acknowledged that his career had not progressed in a straight line: ‘There is another type of career I will describe as erratic and such a career has been mine, a long succession of adventures and resignations. I don’t acknowledge that I was a rolling stone since, for the most part, I knew where I was heading and I haven’t accumulated any moss.’ The history of this intriguing career, which included serving as Liberal Unionist MP for Glasgow’s Camlachie Division (1910–22), Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee (1920–39), British High Commissioner to South Russia (1919–20), the founding of the University of Reading in 1892, Director of the London School of Economics (1903–8), the start of the National Savings Movement (1915), and, last but not least, the establishment of the School of Geography at Oxford University in 1899. What has persisted notwithstanding these noteworthy accomplishments are his strategic concepts. The heartland theory may be used to summarize these. His most significant contribution to strategic philosophy is seen in the three versions that were published in 1904, 1919, and 1943.
Geoffrey Sloan attempts to evaluate and elucidate the beginnings, evolution, and importance of the heartland theory in the piece ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now.’ He identified the nature of the connection between international relations and geography in order to achieve this. There are three ways to look at this connection, he says. First, it might be viewed as a policy goal or a reward in a dispute between two or more states. Any area under a state’s authority may give rise to conflict with another state. This idea implies that one of the state’s main responsibilities is to successfully protect its defined boundaries from outside attacks. On the other hand, a segment of a state’s people may choose to secede and form a new state by peaceful or violent methods, therefore altering the geographical extent of a state’s political power.
The authours of international relations most frequently use this perspective on geography. In essence, geography is one of the pillars of international politics, much like the board in a chess game, even if the geographic extent of certain governments’ political power may vary.
Several traits are shared by the approximately 170 states that participate in international relations. The fact that they are all based on territory is perhaps the most basic. With a few extremely small exceptions, each of them only represents a physical sector of the world’s landmass at the international level. More than one state cannot be in charge of the same area. In contrast to how a farm is split into fields by fences and walls, the globe may thus be thought of as being divided into states by boundaries.
This view’s widespread acceptance is partially due to the way the concept of sovereignty has developed throughout time.
The second way to think of territory is as an environment. This is a natural and historical point of view. It encompasses ‘all the features which specialists in terrain, climate, flora, and fauna are in a position to discern.’ The geographical environment may also be seen historically, which is a longue dureé, or extended duration. In his now-classic study on the Mediterranean, French historian Braudel established this perspective. It was a system he created to address the Mediterranean’s physical topography, as well as the opportunities and constraints it presented for human advancement. The longue durée is essentially a structure, an architectural form that hardly changes throughout time. It is also crucial to stress that there are three different kinds of duration that occur concurrently, and this lengthy duration is just one of them. The impacts of geography are the most enduring and constant:
Long-range duration at a quasi-immobility level of structures and traditions, with the ponderous action of the cosmos, geography, biology, collective psychology, and sociology; middle-range duration of conjunctions or periodic cycles of varying length but rarely surpassing second generations; short-range duration of events, where nearly every action is boom, bang, flash, gnash, mess, and noise, but frequently has only a transient effect.
To paraphrase Braudel, viewing geography as both an environment and a component of longue dureé entails acclimating oneself to a slower speed that occasionally verges on motionlessness. However, this method makes it easier to analyze men and society via territory, despite its sluggish pace.
Third, geography might be seen as a battlefield. Significant changes occur when geography is seen in this way, setting this method apart from the other two. It first gets simplified, schematized, and more abstract. The significance of the animals and plants has diminished. A knowledge of society via geography is not made possible by a slow-moving longue durée. Only geographical aspects pertinent to the military goals he is trying to accomplish will be perceived by the military strategist or commander. The same may be said for a policymaker trying to determine strategic policy priorities.
This outlook of geography as a theatre of military action has a lineage which goes back to antiquity. Writing between 400 and 320 BC, Sun Tzu created a typology that allowed a general to categorize topography based on its usefulness in combat. ‘Ground can be categorized as accessible, entrapping, intrusive, constricted, precipitous, and distant based on its characteristics.’ This Sun Tzu typology effectively demonstrates the idea of geography as a battlefield, which has been reduced and schematized as a result of its use.
Additionally, Sun Tzu made an effort to explain how geography related to the military commander’s goals on the battlefield:
In combat, ground confirmation is crucial. Therefore, the superior general’s skills include estimating the enemy’s position, calculating distances, and assessing the level of terrain complexity in order to control victory. Those who battle with complete awareness of these things will undoubtedly prevail; those who do not will undoubtedly lose.
Geography was also seen to be crucial for the effective deployment of troops at the tactical level.
After looking at the three interpretations of geography, it’s critical to consider how these viewpoints relate to the core idea. It will be claimed that the significance arises from seeing Mackinder’s central idea as a synthesis of the second and third perspectives of territory, a blend of a geographical longue durée and a theatre of military activity. Recent attempts to set Mackinder’s geopolitical views in a framework where an evaluation can be made have not included this perspective on the heartland hypothesis. A further query is raised by this reading of Mackinder’s heartland idea. In the context of a particular historical era, how important is it to comprehend all three interpretations of the heartland theory? Lastly, at the start of the second century, what explanations, if any, can be drawn that point to the heartland theory’s current and potential political and strategic significance?
It is crucial to put the 1904 edition in its historical perspective because of the heartland theory’s later prominence and, some would say, notoriety (it was listed as one of the twenty-nine most significant books ever published, for instance, in 1978). On the evening of January 25, 1904, Halford Mackinder stood up to speak to the Royal Geographical Society. His speech was both in line with domestic issues and out of step with global developments. Mackinder’s thesis, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ addressed a wave of public worry over geography and Britain’s and the Empire’s security. The Boer War’s conclusion in 1902 had raised serious questions about Britain’s place in the globe going forward. In July 1903, a Royal Commission that had been established in September 1902 to expressly look at Britain’s failings in the conflict released its findings. The lack of geographic and cartographic knowledge among British Army staff officers during the battle was one of the flaws found.
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A’Court Repington, The Times’ military correspondent, authored an essay titled ‘Geography and War’ seven months after ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ was published. Repington clarified the connection between geography and military operations in it, saying, ‘We have suffered and we shall continue to suffer, in the conduct of military operations, because the teaching of geography has not assumed its proper place in national education.’ The army has a strong stake in politics, business, and money in this issue.
The idea that the ‘New Geography,’ which Mackinder had described as early as 1887, was distinct from what had come before it was emphasized in this piece and later conversations in The Times mail sections. Additionally, it was now starting to play a significant role in domestic issues and was necessary to maintain Britain’s dominance in the world. Mackinder’s ‘New Geography’ was groundbreaking in that it took a holistic approach. Geographically speaking, one of the organizing ideas was the region: ‘The difference between my effort and those which preceded it was that they made use of the improved maps to illustrate single distributions, e.g. geological, historical etc., whereas I “attempted” a complete geographical “synthesis”…the regional idea was implicit in the paper on the “Scope and Methods of Geography” which I read at the beginning of 1887 before the Royal Geographical Society.’ The first remark made by Spencer Wilkinson following Mackinder’s delivery of his paper, ‘As I was listening to the paper, I looked with regret on some of the space that is unoccupied here, and I much regret that a portion of it was not occupied by members of the Cabinet,’ demonstrated the paper’s continued relevance.
In terms of the public discourse that preceded and followed the release of his article, Mackinder was riding a wave in the country, but this was not the case in the global arena. Russia occupies the “heartland” of the Eurasian continent, demonstrating the impregnable might of a land-based state, according to the heartland idea. But in the first battle of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Navy assaulted Port Arthur two weeks after he gave his speech. In addition, in a naval engagement at Port Arthur in August 1904, the Japanese triumphed against the Russians. The combat of the Tsushima Straits in May 1905, in which the Japanese emerged victorious in a maritime combat, was the last blow.
This fight essentially put an end to the war, as Russian ground strength was defeated.
Mackinder’s 1904 version of the heartland idea received little journalistic attention. Although Mackinder’s perspective reflected public concerns about geography, war, and Britain’s security, it was mostly disregarded. Examining the key concepts outlined in the 1904 speech is crucial to evaluating this claim. The relationship between geography and military might, as well as the political and strategic ramifications of this relationship, serve as the foundation for comprehending Mackinder. Land power and maritime power made up military might in 1904. For Mackinder, one of the basic patterns of international politics was the interplay between these two mediums. The audaciously designed study ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ presented an alternative viewpoint to the prevailing knowledge of the time. The original claim was that the previous four centuries, roughly between 1500 and 1900, may be referred to as the Columbian age. The end of the era would have a huge influence on global politics. Mackinder claimed that the ‘post-Columbian’ era will be drastically different. It is possible to overlook their influence on global politics and strategic concerns. The first would be an exclusive political structure:
We will once more have to deal with a closed governmental structure going forward in the post-Columbian era, but it will still have a global reach. Every explosion of social forces will be vividly echoed from the far side of the planet, shattering weak elements in the global political and economic system instead of dissipating in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and savage chaos.
His goal was to explain human history in terms of the global organism’s existence. He is also conscious of the nuanced connection between location and how policy decisions change. Although the geographic setting does not dictate the decisions made by policymakers, it still has a significant, if not vital, conditioning influence: ‘Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls.’
The significance of the geographical arrangements and settings in which political power is exercised is the second claim. Mackinder emphasized the shifting political significance of a state’s geographic position in particular. This shift was mostly caused by developments in transportation and weaponry technology. Mackinder creates a synthesis between the patterns of physical geography and political history by combining the two previously described aspects. He also makes extensive use of analogy: ‘Europe developed its civilization as a result of foreign barbarism, and a disagreeable personality serves a useful societal role in bringing his adversaries together. Because European culture is, in a very real sense, the result of the secular battle against Asiatic invasion, I would like you to take a minute to see Europe and European history as subservient to Asia and Asiatic history.’
Mackinder uses this fight against the Asiatic invasion as justification to highlight how crucial Russia’s contemporary growth is to the world: ‘The group of smaller territories occupied by the Western Powers and the vast area of Russia occupying half the Continent present the most striking contrast in the political map of modern Europe.’
After that, this geographic arrangement was evaluated by considering it as both a theatre of military activity and a geographical longue durée. This novel geopolitical viewpoint made it easier to comprehend Russia’s strategic significance in relation to Europe in the past and how developments in armaments and transportation might impact it in the future. The Mongol invasion of Europe, which started in the thirteenth century, serves as the historical beginning. Mackinder notes, however, that the Mongols of Genghis Khan and his successors launched three strategic thrusts, including this westward invasion that impacted Poland, Siberia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia. The third is into Northern China, while the second is southwest between the Caspian Sea and the Hindu Kush into what is now Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Horse and camel movement across broad steppe area combined with a central geographic position gave rise to this three-way striking capability. Two significant but unrelated strategic developments occurred during the sixteenth century, which Mackinder referred to as the Tudor Century:
Russian power was transported from Moscow to Siberia throughout the Tudor Century, which concurrently witnessed the maritime development of Western Europe. Even though the two movements stayed separated for a long time, the horsemen’s eastward sweep over Asia had almost as many political ramifications as the rounding of the Cape.
The idea of the geographical pivot of history was given a dynamic that would carry it through the twentieth century by Mackinder’s remarks about the future and the strategic and political ramifications of changes in transport technology, if the historical understanding was insightful. Railways were the particular transportation system he was referring to:
The circumstances of land power are currently being transformed by transcontinental trains, and nowhere can they have such an impact as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia, where there was a lack of accessible stone and timber for building roads. Because they instantly replace the mobility of horses and camels, railroads do bigger miracles on the steppe because the road stage of development has been skipped.
Mackinder also recognized the new technology’s strategic implications for the relationship between military might and location. especially the conflict between land and marine power. The Russian Army in Manchuria is just as important an example of mobile land power as the British Army in South Africa was of sea power. It is true that the Trans-Siberian railway remains a solitary, unreliable means of communication, but it won’t be long before all of Asia is connected by railroads.
The combination of an awareness of the political ramifications of new technology with the persistence of certain spatial patterns of political history is the main strength of Mackinder’s heartland theory, which is present in all variants. With the help of this combination, he was able to explain how a shift in land power brought about by technology would have significant political ramifications for the states situated in the Rimland region of the Eurasian landmass: ‘the oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight.’
In many respects, Mackinder’s claim was revolutionary because, at the start of the twentieth century, he was outlining what had been unattainable at the start of the nineteenth: the development of a closed international political system in which the concept of world dominance was, for the first time, a feasible political objective. Nonetheless, it has been argued that Mackinder and the American frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932) were essentially reflecting, both domestically and internationally, what had been happening to scientific discourse in the second half of the nineteenth century: biology had supplanted geology and philology as the leading evolutionary science. As a result, geography was viewed in two ways:
‘First, the social organism needs space, and second, space needs to be valued highly. This made it certain that there would be a competition for space, similar to the survival of the fittest and species rivalry. The first approach to do this was to claim that civilizations’ inherent propensity to grow or expand geographically was thwarted by the fact that the available space was already occupied. Turner and Mackinder accomplished just that.’ As Mackinder refined the core thesis in the two succeeding versions of ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ this innovative part of the work would become increasingly relevant. Due to its three primary components, it has been suggested that the idea of a closed international political system was intended to succinctly express the modern political message that both Mackinder and Turner desired to make. The three main components include: ‘their conception of the role of environment in history; their comprehension of the force behind progressive sequential change in history; and their isolation of fundamental breaks in this historical process.’
The second thing to note about the 1904 version of the heartland theory is that, at the conclusion of his speech, Mackinder made an appeal against the alluring forces of geographical determinism, which would come to be associated with the post-1945 era: ‘The actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product on the one hand of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples.’ Mackinder reduced this viewpoint to the nuanced connection between location and political and strategic policy. Since ‘the social movements of all times have played around essentially the same physical features,’ the geographic environment has a significant, if not critical, conditioning impact even though it does not determine the decisions made by policymakers. When considered collectively, these elements demonstrate how the 1904 iteration of the heartland hypothesis was both audacious and novel.
Mackinder, an MP since 1910, fully entered public life to help the war effort when the First World War broke out in August 1914. His first initiative was to increase Scottish recruitment for the British Army.
This had come through his acquaintance Lord Haldane bringing his name to the attention of Lord Kitchener, the War Minister. Mackinder set up seven hundred recruitment sites around Scotland in under three days. He was in charge of founding the National Savings Movement in 1915. However, he was unable to get a position at the Cabinet level. Despite having Lord Milner as a sponsor in the War Cabinet, he lacked the solid political foundation necessary to be elected. He remained influential in the House of Commons despite not being promoted to Cabinet status. ‘Mackinder expanded his speaking brief in the House during the war to cover nearly every topic that was discussed, such as the cost of coal, the availability of ploughmen, working-class housing, and margarine. Being one of the few who saw that even victory would cause the economy to be disrupted and the fabric of society to be harmed, he expressed apprehension for Britain’s post-war economic and social situation.’
There was also a geopolitical aspect to the post-war world’s worry. Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, which was published in 1919, marked its conclusion. It began in December of 1914. Professor Lyde spoke to the Royal Geographical Society that month about ‘Types of Political Frontiers in Europe.’ He maintained that there were three a priori requirements that would be crucial in the future for border adjustments to promote enduring peace. These were listed as follows: first, the social unit should, to the greatest extent feasible, coincide with a geographical unit; second, the ability to assimilate new populations should be crucial in the exercise of political sovereignty over new geographical areas; and third, frontiers should include features where various populations naturally converge. Mountain crests and waterdivides are not appropriate.
Mackinder, who attended the speeches, provided an entirely different view in the conversation that followed. He maintained that political negotiation is the process by which borders are established:
I believe that the traditional notion of the balance of power will reappear in any European congress, which implies that borders will be established through the traditional negotiating process. Just imagine what may happen after this conflict ends. You will not eradicate German nationality. That is not feasible, and if it were, it would not be desired. Eight or ten million German Austrians must be added to the 60 or 62 million people in the German Empire. It will be necessary to cope with a 70 million-strong nationality with a strong sense of national identity in the heart of Europe. I doubt there will be much perfect map-making since it will still be such a powerful force. The goal will be to trim that power’s wings for the future if you defeat it.
It is possible to trace the development of geopolitical thought from Mackinder’s prophetic remarks from December 1914. The geographic location and population size of Germany constituted the first component.
The need of ensuring the formation of smaller states in the region of Eastern Europe was the second aspect of his thought during World War I. By 1916, Mackinder had contributed to the Serbian Society’s formation. This group advocated for the creation of the future Yugoslavia. He made the case that Serbia would include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia in a September 1916 newspaper article. The historian R.W. Seaton-Watson and the scholar and future political leader Tomas G. Masaryk were among the members of the New Europe Group that he was lured into during this time. In October 1916, Seaton-Watson established a weekly newspaper called The New Europe. By 1917, Mackinder had become an advocate for the region’s national goals; in July 1918, he was recognized as one of the collaborators on The New Europe.
The release of Democratic Ideals and Reality in 1919 led to the consolidation of the two previously mentioned aspects. Mackinder’s most significant contribution to the growth of the heartland theory was to be represented by this study. Additionally, it was to have a significant impact on his career. For the first time in global history, a closed international political structure emerged, making world dominance a feasible political goal. This was the primary strategic idea underlying the geographic pivot of history that Mackinder described in 1904. Mackinder made significant adjustments and revelations in his 1919 edition. First, the pivot of history was given a new name, the heartland, and its geographic extent was broadened:
The Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia are all considered part of the heartland for the sake of strategic thinking. Thus, it contained Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Brandenburg-Prussia—a huge triple basis of labour that the horse-riders of history lacked. The heartland is the area that marine power can be denied access to in the present day.
The second was the actual strategic impact that evolving transportation and weaponry technologies would have on the heartland as a result of historical and geographical facts:
Both the transcontinental railroad and the automobile are available to militaries today. They also possess the boomerang-style aircraft, a weapon of land power as opposed to sea power. To put it succinctly, a powerful military force that controlled Arabia and the heartland could easily seize control of the global crossroads at Suez.
Mackinder also highlighted the significance of the threat that land power may pose to sea power in the twentieth century. Although we have overcome the threat this time, geographical realities still exist and present land power with more and more strategic advantages over maritime power. Manpower and organization were cited as two of the factors that led to the formation of this danger. Mackinder contended that a significant foundation of manpower capable of endangering global liberty from within the citadel of the World Island had only been present in the previous 100 years, or from 1819. A numerical sufficiency was closely associated with organization:
Manpower, or the power of men, is also heavily dependent on organization, or, to put it another way, on the “growing concern,” the social organization. Due to its recognition of both geographical and economic realities and its exclusive focus on them, German Kultur, or the “ways and means” ideology, has proven perilous to the outside world.
Aside from the three already mentioned, the main distinction between the 1904 and 1919 versions was their emphasis on Central Europe as the potential centre of power in a conflict between land and sea power. Moreover, the 1904 edition was not prescriptive like Mackinder’s second version was. It fulfilled Mackinder’s 1914 demand that geography ‘give judgement in practical conduct.’ The second iteration of the heartland hyposthesis made excellent use of this strategy.
‘You cannot now accept any outcome of the War that does not ultimately resolve the issue between German and Slav, and true independence of each, unless you would cause trouble for the future.’ A slave on the chariot behind a triumphant Roman commander whispered in his ear that he was mortal as he entered the city amid the head-turning splendour of a “triumph.” The following proverb should occasionally be spoken to statesmen while they are speaking with the vanquished enemy:
Who rules East Europe controls the heartland:
Who rules the heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
Mackinder’s geopolitical jingles would later become widely used. The fall of the German-Russian two-state system in Eastern Europe and the rise of a number of League of Nations-backed middle-tier states there served as the antidote to this situation.
The irony was that the book received little attention, and despite wise remarks like ‘if we accept anything less than a complete solution of the Eastern Question in its longest sense we shall merely have gained a respite, and our descendants will find themselves under the necessity of marshalling their power afresh for the siege of the heartland,’ it is difficult to locate any historical evidence that directly links any aspect of British policy during this time to Mackinder’s second version of the heartland theory.
However, there was one significant impact on Mackinder’s professional life. In October 1919, Lord Curzon, a friend of Mackinder’s, became Foreign Secretary. Following this appointment, Curzon asked Mackinder if he would accept the position of British High Commissioner to South Russia, where he would coordinate efforts to support General Deniken, who was commanding White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks. Although Mackinder’s mission was short-lived, his impact on British strategy presents us with the difficult juxtaposition of a distinct geopolitical vision and eventual policy failure. In January 1920, Mackinder’s report, prepared aboard the cruiser HMS Centaur, off Marseilles, offered the British government a comprehensive strategy for countering the Bolshevik menace. It promoted the further separation of the Caucasus and Eastern Europe into a number of nations that stretched from north to south. White Russia, the Ukraine, South Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan would be included in this buffer zone.
Furthermore, Mackinder declared the programme of providing stores and military supplies to the several White Russian forces to be a failure, despite the significant costs involved. For instance, between November 1918 and October 1919, Lloyd George’s administration paid the White Russian army £17.3 million in cash and provided them with marketable stocks. The deployment of army, navy, and air force contingents cost an additional £27.1 million.
Mackinder, in contrast, had a clear strategic vision: ‘It is now evident that the Denikin Government alone cannot defeat Bolshevism, and that the method of mere military adventure associated with the names of [Admiral] Koltchak [Kolchak], Yechenitch [Yudenich], and Denikin must be abandoned.’ A system of alliances and stable organization pari passu with restricted military appropriations must be implemented in its place. Additionally, Mackinder was able to explain a distinct geographical threat that would materialize if Bolshevism was not restrained within two boundaries. Geographical and political obstacles were present. An of recently independent republics in the west and the Caucasian highlands and Caspian Sea in the east.
However, Mackinder also noticed that the last component had a transient aspect:
The only way to stop the spread of Bolshevism, which is spreading like a prairie fire, and prevent it from reaching India and Lower Asia until Poland and the Odessa are resolved, is to take decisive action before the Volga ice thaws. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider the Caspian and Caucasian barrier as a component of the broader strategy because any success of that Polish and South Russian advance along a line that stretches from the Gulf of Finland to the Sea of Azoff would tend to push the Bolsheviks into Asia. However, I cannot see a Caucasian barrier as anything more than a short-term, insignificant solution; eliminating Bolshevism at its root is the only viable solution.
Interestingly, Mackinder’s assignment to South Russia may have served as a contact with Britain’s foreign intelligence service (SIS). This is evident from a letter Mackinder addressed to Curzon on November 23, 1919, in which he defended the number of his personal staff. Specifically, the choice to send a doctor on such a little mission:
I’ve been informed that the YMCA is planning a significant humanitarian mission to South Russia, which will be supported by a substantial amount of funding. The most seasoned Anglo-Russian guys here, such as Bagge, Reilly, and Dukes, tell me that this altruistic endeavour will likely have a greater impact on the Russian people than anything else. In this regard, I believe my doctor would serve as a liaison officer.
It is also crucial to emphasize that by the time Mackinder met these three intelligence operatives in November 1919, the Cheka, the Soviet secret police, had discovered every SIS activity in Russia. As a result, accurate information on circumstances in Soviet Russia was severely lacking. An October 1919 Cabinet note reflects this: ‘No authoritative statement has ever been made about conditions in Soviet Russia and there is no question upon which people differ more widely.’ Perhaps more significantly, Lord Curzon’s December 1919 supplemental instructions to Mackinder reflected this:
The Cabinet specifically wanted Mackinder’s instructions to be supplemented in one way. In addition, Denikin’s actual policy toward the states in front of and behind him is sometimes so unclear that HMG would like to receive a report from you on the entire situation in all of its various aspects before beginning any new policy for the future. The information regarding many of these areas is so contradictory and so little is known with certainty about the condition and feeling in those parts of Southern Russia that have passed into his hands during his advance. The government will benefit most from this as it will help them comprehend the current state of affairs and create future policies.
It is possible to read Mackinder’s assessment on the state of affairs in South Russia as a combination of an intelligence report and a geographical forecast for the stability of ties between the heartland and Eastern Europe in the future. Mackinder was presented before the British Cabinet eight days after delivering the report, and the ministers questioned him about it. His persistent defence of a ‘whole policy’ that was ingrained in the geographical bounds of the heartland idea is what is evident in this Cabinet discussion. A geopolitical longue durée and a theatre of military action were combined to form geography. Its primary goal was to present to the British Cabinet of 1920 a perspective on events in Bolshevik Russia that might be adjusted to Britain’s and, in fact, Europe’s benefit by considering political developments as well as the physical arrangement of land and sea:
He would provide a certain level of support to every anti-Bolshevist state, ranging from Finland to the Caucasus. For defensive reasons, Deniken should be re-equipped, but on a smaller scale. We have to be ready to seize Deniken’s navy in the Caspian and hold the Baku-Batum line. Any assistance policy for individual states will only result in financial waste and ineffective action. Either implement the entire policy or take no action.
Mackinder has suggested the following urgent, doable measures to strengthen Britain’s standing in Russia. His initial report on January 21, 1920, contained these. These suggestions demonstrate Mackinder’s understanding of the significance of having a favourable geographic area in which to wield economic and military might. Additionally, it was necessary to make sure that his ‘whole policy’ was not compromised by a rise in geographic vulnerability brought on by poor decisions made by British policymakers or the Bolshevik regime’s actions:
Britain should make a clear statement, in particular, that she will not make peace with Bolshevism; it is she, not France, that is suspect; it is her support, not France’s, that is valued; it is Mr. Lloyd George’s unwavering pledge, not M. Clemenceau’s, that is desired, and ardently desired. The protected regions of Odessa and Novorossisk, as well as the Isthmus of Perikop (the entry to the Crimea), should receive prompt naval and technological support. As long as the Poles form an alliance with Deniken on favourable conditions about their eastern boundary, assistance in the form of loans should be given. If the Deniken Government’s bases are expanded, it should be acknowledged as de facto.
Unfortunately, political developments worked against Mackinder’s geopolitical theory. Policy makers correctly believed that isolating the Bolshevik rule from the rest of the world was the best way to deal with it since people in Britain and Europe were fed up with war and foreign adventures. As a result, his plan to establish a number of buffer states—White Russia, the Ukraine, South Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan—was unsuccessful. Mackinder argued that Russia’s chances of becoming a major heartland power would rise if this programme was abandoned.
It was now evident that the Cabinet was not committed to the policy that Mackinder had described. Following Mackinder’s report to them on January 29, 1920, there was a brief debate about British policy towards Russia: ‘the immediate steps proposed in Sir Halford Mackinder’s Report (Appendix II) did not meet with any support. The Cabinet decided to postpone discussing Sir Halford Mackinder’s return to South Russia until the Allies’ policy in Russia was further developed and decided.’ One could argue that the main reason Mackinder’s attempt to apply his second version of the heartland theory to make practical decisions failed was because decision-makers perceived a lack of public support for ongoing foreign intervention following a war that had cost Britain one million war dead.
Twelve independent entities, ranging from Estonia in the north to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the south, arose after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Moreover, a brand-new geopolitical concept had surfaced. It closely resembled the proposal Mackinder made to the British Cabinet in January 1920. The goal of Mackinder’s ‘whole policy’ was to avoid the rise of a centralized military force that he referred to as a ‘Jacobian Czardom’ and to establish a favourable geographical field in which the ideological menace of Bolshevist domination could be neutralized.
These dangers don’t exist anymore. The enormous oil reserves that are thought to exist in the Caspian region, however, have taken its place: ‘estimates of proven and possible reserves across the entire area run to two hundred billion barrels of oil product. This contains discovered reserves of about 30 billion barrels, about equivalent to those found in the North Sea.’ According to others, ‘Central Asia is once again a key to the security of all Eurasia.’ A cogent geopolitical analysis that clarifies the current constellation of political and economic factors as well as the geopolitical space where strategic and economic influence may be used has not yet surfaced from the major Western Powers. In a special edition, John Erickson examines the specifics of this topic.
The Second World War marked the emergence of the third iteration of the heartland idea. At the age of 82, Mackinder wrote in 1943 amid the chaos of yet another war. Nevertheless, a distinct geopolitical perspective was offered despite his advanced age and the widespread and worldwide character of the conflict he was experiencing. Mackinder emphasizes the term ‘Heartland,’ which appears only once in the 1904 text. The phrase ‘the Heartland provides a sufficient physical basis for strategical thinking’ transforms from a descriptive to a technical one. Additionally, he claims that it is more useful in 1943 than it has ever been: ‘I have explained my idea of the Heartland, which I firmly believe is more relevant and helpful now than it was twenty or forty years ago.’
In his 1904 edition, Mackinder described the ‘pivotal area’ as being mainly economically underdeveloped. However, by 1943, his prediction about the Bolsheviks’ continued capacity for organization combined with their advantageous geographic position was beginning to come true:
However, the Heartland’s enormous potential and the natural reserves in Lenaland—Mackinder’s designation for a sizable portion of the USSR’s Far East beyond the Yenisei River—are strategically advantageous. In places like the southern Urals, the pivot of the pivot regions, and the rich Kuznetsk core basin in the shade of the vast natural barrier east of the upper Yenisei River, industries are expanding quickly. Russia was the world’s largest producer of the following foods in 1938. Barley, Oats, Rye, Beet, and Wheat. More Manganese was produced in Russia than in any other country. In terms of iron output, it was tied for first position with the US, while in terms of petroleum production, it was ranked second.
Mackinder perceived two threats to the maritime powers’ hegemony. First came Germany. This nation was described as a channel that would need to be cleaned up and managed in the future using a combination of sea and land power: ‘The polluted channel might be swept clear very effectively if it were controlled by strong embankments of power on either hand—land power to the east, in the Heartland, and sea power to the west, in the North Atlantic basin. Face the German psyche with the unwavering conviction that any war Germany wages must be fought on two unbreakable fronts and that the Germans will find a solution.’ The Soviet Union posed another challenge. ‘The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth,’ which would make her the world’s most powerful land power if she were to conquer Germany. It is staffed by a garrison that is adequate in both quantity and quality for the first time in its existence.
Ironically, Mackinder created his most significant idea after the heartland as a response to the threat posed by a reviving Germany rather than the Soviet Union. Its fundamental concept was amphibiosity, which held that in order to counteract the threat posed by land power, sea power must ultimately be able to project strength ashore. The Midland Ocean is the term given to the notion. The North Atlantic and its dependent seas and river basins comprised its geographic span. Additionally, it consisted of ‘a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture, and industries in the eastern United States and Canada.’ The three components’ locations and the trinity of amphibiosity suggested that the centre of power had once again shifted westward. Additionally, when the NATO alliance was founded in 1949, he accurately predicted its geopolitical structure.
It is possible to draw two conclusions regarding the Midland Ocean. First of all, Mackinder’s writing was nothing new. It first surfaced as an embryo in 1924:
For many purposes, North America and Western Europe today make up one community of countries. When American and Canadian forces travelled over the Atlantic to fight in France during the Great War, that truth was first made completely clear. The east of the United States has the most prolific coalfields and the greatest rainfall, while the west of Europe has both. As a result, the east of North America and the west of Europe are physically complementary to one another and are quickly becoming into the equal halves of a single great community.
The second crucial issue was that Mackinder’s third edition is set in the midst of a conflict that, twenty years before, was unthinkable and saw amphibiosity mature and be implemented on a worldwide scale. Six hundred amphibious landings, or one every three and a half days on average, occurred during the Second World War. Almost all of these landings were also successful. One may argue that he demonstrated an understanding of the significance of sea power in comparison to land power in the third edition. To put it another way, it only counts if it has an impact on a state’s capacity to govern and defend its territory throughout times of peace and conflict.
What conclusions may be drawn about the current and potential applicability of Mackinder’s heartland theory on the eve of the twenty-first century after analyzing the three iterations of the theory in their historical context? One may claim that the heartland idea is no longer applicable. It is noteworthy that Mackinder himself maintained that ‘every century has its own geographical perspective,’ despite the fact that it emerged as the predominant geopolitical paradigm of the Cold War and played a significant role in the US containment strategy against the Soviet Union. New geographical viewpoints that may differ from those of the twentieth century will develop as the twenty-first century progresses.
However, it is possible to suggest that Mackinder’s core theory contains three analytical facets that are still relevant in the twenty-first century. For the first time, Mackinder recognized the presence of a closed international state system in which the notion of global dominance was a feasible political goal. This type of arrangement will continue to exist in the twenty-first century, and further advancements in weaponry and transportation technology will undoubtedly make interstate relations much more intricate and complicated than they have ever been. Second, the geographical viewpoint of the twenty-first century may be outlined using the theoretical legacy Mackinder left behind with the heartland thesis. His goal was to highlight political history’s regional trends.
People can now see some of the actual proportions of the world’s traits and events for the first time, and they may search for a formula that will explain certain features of global history at any rate of geographical causation. If people are fortunate, that formula ought to help them understand some of the conflicting forces in global politics.
This statement was announced when the twentieth century was four years old. It also shares many similarities with contemporary writers’ perspectives on international relations theory: ‘Theory is used in international relations not only to define concepts and categories but used to draw concepts together so as to outline perspectives or build up “maps” of the international area.’
Lastly, Mackinder’s theories have frequently been linked to environmental decision-making. From 1933 until 1945, the German school of geopolitics used his views, which led to this. However, he took great care to emphasize in the 1919 version of the heartland thesis that a nation’s geographic position was not the only factor that made it a ‘going concern.’ Political structure and the availability of labour were equally important. He defined ‘manpower’ as their quantity, effectiveness, competence, and well-being. In summary, another aspect of the legacy for the future is that, albeit not dictating policy makers’ decisions, the geographic context still has a significant, if not crucial, conditioning impact. As a result, the geopolitical outlook that Mackinder worked so hard to develop over a thirty-nine-year period is not an inflexible imperialist paradigm; rather, like any good geopolitical analysis, it depicted the constellation of forces that existed at a specific time and within a specific geographical frame of reference.
Mackinder also grasped that in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity were constant, the process of explanation and understanding required ongoing adaptation to changing situations and circumstances. He first expressed this geopolitical perspective in 1915. His statement, ‘If we try to obtain laws from our human geography and especially laws which guide our action politically, we are attempting that which I believe is doomed to failure,’ is a perfect testament to the approach’s modernity and future relevance. We’ll make both scientists and historians criticize geography.’
